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BOOK REVIEW

By Tinsley E.
Yarbrough, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 1988 Pp.
323. Hardbound.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS,

Reviewed by Paul Brickner"
Justice Hugo Lafayette Black, one of the great American
jurists of this century and in the history of the Supreme
Court, has demonstrated a lasting power that few would have
foreseen at the time of his appointment by President Roosevelt in 1937. His brilliance and achievements in American
constitutional law will earn him continuing recognition in the
marketplace of ideas, long after many of his, critics, both
early and late, are forgotten.
Professor Tinsley E. Yarbrough or East Carolina University has written an important study of Justice Black's jurisprudence. His respect and admiration for the Justice seem to
make the author a bit overly protective towards Justice Black.
However, few authors come to a subject with total objectivity.
Indeed, almost anyone writing about a Supreme Court Justice will be either an admirer or detractor. However, Profes-
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1. Hambleton, The All-Time, All-Stat; All-Era Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 462,
464 (1983), lists Justice Black among the top nine Justices in the history of the
Supreme Court; F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 264-65 (1955).
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sor Yarbrough's hero worship is so transparent that it does
not significantly diminish the value of this excellent undertaking.' The reader quickly gets used to the recurring pattern
of the professor in reporting criticism and then rushing to
the defense of Justice Black.
Other shortcomings of this study include the failure of
the author to identify some of the authorities that he cites.
They may be big names in legal education or in political
science, but for many readers some identification of Sylvia
Snowiss, John Hart Ely and others would have been helpful.
The same is true of many of the terms commonly used by
scholars of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. Ordinary
readers may have a tough time recalling what they mean. An
appendix with short definitions to explain the meanings of
terms, schools of philosophy, and schools of interpretation
would have been welcomed by many readers. In addition, a
short biographical introduction would have been in order.
While Professor Yarbrough has devoted much of his academic career to the study of Justice Black, he cannot assume that
his readers will be well versed in the background of Black or
any other justice, not even Justices Marshall, Holmes or
Cardozo. Interpretivism, noninterpretivism, positivism, Van
Alstyne, Perry and other personal names and jurisprudential
designations need to be identified. Only a small group of
academicians will recognize these names and phrases. Professor Yarbrough's undertaking deserves a broader audience
and should not appear to limit itself to the restricted readership of the academic world.
The author first identifies Justice Black's critics, both
judicial and scholastic. Noteworthy among his judicial critics
were Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson.
The academic critics were more numerous, ranging from
Charles Fairman of Stanford Law School, in the early years
of Justice Black's judicial career, to an increasing cadre of
critics as Black became a more formidable figure on our
High Court.
Justice Black's background in Alabama included service
as a police court judge, undoubtedly an important experi-

2. In telling language, Yarbrough dedicates his book, "To my mother, Another strong-minded, granite-willed Alabamian." T. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK
AND Ills CRITCS (1988).
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ence; twice elected county prosecuting attorney and elected
as United States Senator.' His previous Ku Klux Klan membership became a cause for concern at the time of his nomination for the high court.4
Professor Yarbrough tells us about Justice Black's "constitutional faith" by quoting from a major address that Black
delivered at the Columbia University School of Law in
1968.- By then, Black was an experienced and seasoned jurist. Yarbrough tells us, "[T]he Constitution was his 'legal
bible,' its 'plan of our government' his plan, its 'destiny' his
destiny. 'I cherish every word of it, from the first to the
last,' . . . 'and I personally deplore even the slightest deviation from its least important commands."' 6 This statement of
constitutional faith was supplemented by another fundamental belief of Black, a belief in what he called "our federalism."' Justice Black has set forth that concept in an opinion
which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has described as both
"memorable" and "important."' This is important to understanding Justice Black's constitutional faith and concept of
constitutional interpretation.
The concept [of our federalism] does not mean blind
deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in
our National Government and its courts. The Framers
rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights
and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities

3. Frank, Hugo L. Black TIlE JUSTICES OF T14E UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 3, 2321, 2324, 2326-27 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969); J. SIMON, TIlE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA, 73-74 (1989).
4. Frank, supra note 3, at 2326. See also J. SIMON, supra note 3, at 86-87,
97-99.
5. H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968).
6. Id. at 66. See also T. Yarbrough, supra note 2, at 20.
7. T. YARBROUGH, supra note 2, at 34. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971).
8. O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. 1, 9 (1984-85).
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9
of the States.

With these two statements as something of a cornerstone
of his beliefs, we can better understand Professor
Yarbrough's analysis of Justice Black's jurisprudence and
rejection of most of the opinions of Black's critics.
Yarbrough observes that Justice Black, at one time of another, "was identified with each of the three main jurisprudential currents in the history of American law-natural law,
positivism, and sociological jurisprudence." ° Yarbrough
places Justice Black in the positivist camp, defining positivism
as consisting of four tenets or values," while noting that,
"[p]ositivists and students of legal positivism are not of one
mind as to what positivist jurisprudence entails." Professor
Yarbrough might have been just as well off to eliminate the
jurisprudential classifications and write a more informal study
of Justice Black and his critics. Dean James F. Simon of the
New York Law School has produced a more popularly written study of both Justices Black and Frankfurter 3 that has
great merit and achieves the virtue of being easy to read.
Had Dean James J. Simon conceptualized his study in terms
of jurisprudence, he would have reduced the size of his potential readership and deprived many educated, but not technically oriented, readers of a valuable and interesting chapter
in the lives of two giants of the law and in the history of the
Supreme Court.
Hugo Black's judicial greatness was as much a product
of his background in the deep South and his populist political outlook as it was a function of any jurisprudential suit
into which he can be fitted. Justice Black acquired the values
of Christian fundamentalism and a literal interpretation of
the letter of the law as well as of scripture. Indeed, in
Griswold v. Connecticut,'4 his dissent from the concept of a
Constitutional right to privacy in marriage concluded with
words that must have been taken from a hymn long popular
in the South, "The Old Time Religion." 5 Black, noting that

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
T. YARBROUGH, supra note 2, at
T. YARBROUGH, supm note 2, at
T. YARBROUGH, supm note 2, at
J. Simon, supra note 3.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Tillman, The Old Time Religion,

21.
23.
23.

WORLD RENOWNED HYMNS, No. 244 (R.
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the Constitution provided for change by amendment, not by
judicial legislation, observed "[t]hat method of change was
old-fashioned I
good for our Fathers, and being somewhat
16
must add it is good enough for me."
One can almost hear a joyful Sunday school class of
youngsters singing in the words of Justice Black's dissent,
it was good for our
"Give me that old time religion ...
mothers . .. and it's good enough for me . . . it was good
for our fathers . . . it was good for the Hebrew children ...
and it's good enough for me."" A back to the basics philosophy with literal interpretation rather than intellectualized
analysis appealed to Black.
In a similar fashion, Hugo Lafayette Black populist outlook can be considered paramount in his thinking and more
clearly understandable than any jurisprudential label. Chief
Justice Rehnquist provides the following description of Hugo
Black, dating back to 1952 when he served as a law clerk to
Justice Robert H. Jackson, of Hugo Black the populist justice:
Hugo Lafayette Black was the senior associate justice on
the Court. He had one of the most mellifluous voices
and delightful accents that I, a northerner, had ever
heard. Not for nothing had he been a renowned stump
speaker in his two victorious campaigns to be elected
United States Senator from Alabama. I can still remember him beginning his announcement of a dissenting
opinion in a rather technical and uninteresting case involving administrative law by saying that the case in-

volved a fight between "large corporate truckers" and
"little independent truckers"; the correct result, in Justice
Black's eyes, seemed foreordained by the description of
the parties.'
Black's background, more than a particularized description of his philosophy, provides great insight into his judging
process. In 1955, long before Black's retirement in 1971,
professor Fred Rodell, of the Yale Law School, wrote an
excellent sketch of Justice Black,

Torrey ed. 1909); WINONA HYMNS No. 168 (E. Excell ed.).

16. T. YARBROUGH, suprn note 2, at 23 (quoting from Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
17. Tillman, supra note 15.
18.

W. REHNQUIsT, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAs, How IT is 70 (1987).
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Hugo Black-first FDR appointee, more-or-less acknowledged (or else resented) intellectual leader of the New
Deal Court, and dean of today's Court-was born in a
crossroads cabin in the small-farm cotton country of
Alabama, eighth child of a onetime volunteer in the Confederate Army, and, despite some slight formal schooling,
including less than two years of copy-book law, has been
rigorously educating himself throughout most of the
sixty-nine years since his birth. Like at least two great
Justices of the past, John Marshall and Samuel Miller .. ,
Black turned his meagerness of conventional training into
a see-things-straight boon rather than a confusion-ridden
curse; unlike some of his recent predecessors who also
rose from the bottom to the top under their own steam,
Black continued to care about, and identify himself with,
those less lucky or less gifted than lie . . . Black, a mellow and gentle-mannered man whose slight Southern
drawl belies his tempered-steel mind, has the rare capacity of not transmitting his militant ideas and ideals into
19
personal enniity toward those who disagree.
Professor Yarbrough looks beyond Black's positivism and
devotes two admirable chapters to his thesis of incorporation
of the entire Bill of Rights through the fourteenth amendment, making them binding on the states and to his interpretation of the first amendment in absolute terms. Indeed,
Yarbrough tells us that Black considered his 1947 dissent in
Adamson v. California,2" his most important opinion." In
that dissent, he articulated his opinion that the Founding Fathers had incorporated the entire Bill of Rights through the
fourteenth amendment. Professor Archibald Cox tells us that

some historians support the outlook of Justice Black, but that
a probable majority disagree with him.
In Palko v. Connecticut,22 before Justice Black's arrival,
the Supreme Court had rejected the incorporation doctrine.
Despite Black's tenacity over the years, the incorporation doctrine has never been accepted by the court. However, Dean
Simon has pointed out that,
The Court majority never fully accepted Black's theory,

19. F. Roddll, supn note 1, at 264-65.
20. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
21. T. YARBROUGii, supra note 2, at 79.

22. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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but his strong advocacy did, in fact, push the Justices
toward incorporating more and more of the Bill of
Rights on a selective basis. With [Black's dissent in] Adamson, Black's reputation as the intellectual leader of the
liberal wing of the Court was further strengthened. His
allegiance to the individual liberties of the Bill of Rights
was now complete and a matter of impressive public record. At the same time, Frankfurter's opposition to the
as further evidence of his
incorporation theory was 2seen
3
anti-libertarian sympathies.
In a brief few years, Black had overtaken Justice Frankfurter as the expected intellectual leader of the liberal block
on the Court. The self-made scholar had garnered support
among his brethren that the Harvard Law Professor seated
beside him had been unable to claim. Frankfurter had faltered, particularly on the Jehovah's Witness flag salute cas-.
24
es.
But for Justice Holmes, Justice Black has been the most
creative and original thinker on the Supreme Court in the
twentieth century. He saw his way through layers of technical
legal reasoning and analysis and reached different conclusions abounded fundamental issues. For example, as a newcomer to the Court, he did not hesitate to differ with established majorities by attacking the principle that the fourteenth amendment protected corporations. Black stated clearly that the post-Civil War amendment was designed to pro5
tect persons and not business entities.2
Professor Yarbrough provides a thorough analysis of
Black's incorporation doctrine and develops pros and cons
with respect to the arguments of Black's critics. He then
moves on to Justice Black's absolutist interpretation of the
first amendment to the Constitution.
Justice Black took at face value the first amendment's
decree that Congress shall make "no law." Black's absolutist
approach was criticized by many, including Erwin Griswold, a
distinguished Ohioan who served as Dean of Harvard Law
School and U.S. Solicitor General. Yarbrough tells us that

23. J. SIMON, supra note 3, at 179.
24. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); West Virginia Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
25. T. YARBROUGH, supra note 2, at 28-29; see also Connecticut General Life
Insurance v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
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Griswold preferred a balancing approach." Philosopher Sidney Hook wondered whether the absolutist approach to freedom of religion would prevent Congress from outlawing
polygamy and human sacrifice. Would Justice Black stick to
his "no law means no law" approach in the face of claims of
freedom of religion for those practices? Professor Yarbrough,
who sometimes speaks for Justice Black, does not voice a
response to Hook. Nevertheless, Black's outlook was important to him, so important that he voted to support individuals whose outlooks must have been abhorrent to him. He
dissented from the Supreme Court's decision approving
"non-communist" affidavits required of labor union officials
in American Communications Association. v. Douds,2" and dissented from the conviction in Dennis v. United States2 8 for
conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government by
force and violence. But in an area of current interest, Black
supported the right of a state to prohibit flag burning. Conduct such as burning the American flag, even if accompanied
by spoken words, was not, for Black, protected as speech. 9
Hugo Lafayette Black has earned a very special place for
himself in the history of American law and in the history of
our Supreme Court. He is the kind of liberal that conservatives can turn to and quote with approval. He was a brilliant
man who, though self-educated in many ways, could win
arguments against learned scholars. He understood what
grass roots America was thinking, because he had been there
seeking votes of the citizenry. His political experiences
helped him understand those aspects of human nature that
are of a baser type and from which the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights protects us all. Professor Yarbrough has produced a superb study of a great American jurist who valued
our Federal system of government and who cherished those
fundamental rights and liberties that make us a free people
and a great nation.

26.

T. YARBROUGH, supra note 2, at 127-28.

27. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
28. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
29. T. YARBROUGH, supra note 2, at 136; see also Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 610 (1969).

